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The Impact of Certain and Uncertain Store Promotions  
on the Decision-Making Process in Product Choices 
 
Short Abstract 
Various store promotions ranging from dollar-off discount to sweepstakes can 
influence product choices through promotion-induced affect. Incorporating recent research 
on the uncertainty of incidental affect, this paper examines how various promotions differ 
in the feeling of uncertainty elicited, which, in turn, influence the decision-making process 
of product choices. Specifically, the experiment demonstrates that uncertain promotions 
can increase (decrease) the extent of systematic decision-making in the subsequent product 
choice relative to certain promotions and a no promotion situation when the choice is easy 
(difficult). The implications to the incidental affect and promotion research are discussed.  
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Long Abstract 
Store promotions presented at the beginning of a consumer’s shopping trip influence 
the consumer’s affective states during the trip (e.g., Gardner 1985). Although the 
promotion-induced affect should be regarded as irrelevant in subsequent product choices, 
previous research shows that it influences a consumer’s choice decision (e.g., Heilman, 
Nakamoto and Rao 2002). The impact of promotion-induced affect on a consumer’s 
product choice can find theoretical support from the incidental affect literature, which has 
demonstrated that affect elicited in one incident extends its effect to other unrelated 
incidents (Isen 2001).  However, a majority of incidental affect research compares the 
impact of positive affect with that of negative affect and neutral state. Although this group 
of studies is helpful for us to predict the impact of store promotions in general, it may be 
insufficient to discriminate the impact of a variety of promotions which generally would 
make consumers feel positive, since relative pleasantness is quite unimportant to 
differentiate positive emotions (Smith and Ellsworth 1985).  
Recent incidental affect literature demonstrates that, regardless of valence, the 
uncertainty associated with an affect influences the extent of systematic decision-making 
of a subsequent judgment (e.g.,Tiedens and Linton 2001). Since promotions are different 
in terms of the uncertainty of the benefit provided (e.g., an instant dollar-off coupon 
provides more certain benefit than a sweepstakes), a promotion providing a probabilistic 
benefit may make consumers feel more uncertain than a promotion providing a sure and 
immediate benefit. Thus, focusing on the uncertainty of promotion-induced affect can be 
important in differentiating the impact of types of promotions on subsequent product 
choice process. 
Although it is shown that uncertainty can decrease confidence and leads to more 
systematic decision making, there exist inconsistent findings which shows less systematic 
decision making when subjects feel uncertain (e.g., Bodenhausen et al 2000). This 
inconsistency may be explained by the effect of uncertainty on perceived ability. 
Uncertainty to which people have no control can also decrease a subject’s perceived ability 
(Sedek, Kofta and Tyszka 1993), which, according to the ability and motivation 
framework, would decrease the extent of systematic decision making.  
According to the affect-as-information theory (Schwarz 1990), we expect that the 
uncertainty can decrease perceived ability when one is ambiguous about his ability of 
accomplishing a task. This can be examined by varying choice difficulty. When a choice is 
easy, people generally perceive themselves as being capable of systematically analyzing 
information to make a choice. Since the ability assessment is not ambiguous, the feeling of 
uncertainty induced by an uncertain promotion is less likely to add any informational value 
for the perceived ability judgment and thus should not decrease the perceived ability. Since 
in this case, an uncertain promotion may decrease a subject’s confidence (Tiedens and 
Linton 2001) but not perceived ability, it is expected that uncertain promotion would lead 
to a more systematic decision-making process than the certain promotion and the no-
promotion situation. In contrast, when a choice is difficult, it is often ambiguous to a 
subject whether he/she can systematically analyze all the information to make a correct 
choice (Payne, Bettman and Johnson 1988). In such cases, a subject is more likely to rely 
on his/her affective state as an informational cue for the perceived ability judgment. Thus, 
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the feeling of uncertainty induced by an uncertain promotion is more likely to decrease a 
subject’s perceived ability and lead to a less systematic decision-making process relative to 
a certain promotion and a no-promotion situation, The hypotheses were examined by a lab 
experiment.  
The experiment (N= 360) investigated the extent of systematic decision making by 
comparing the impact of feature importance on the choice decision. Subjects who were 
more (vs. less) systematic should scrutinize the product features more carefully and thus be 
more likely to differentiate high-importance features from low-importance features. Thus, 
their decisions should be greatly influenced by the feature importance and more subjects 
should choose the option that was dominant on high-importance features (vs. low-
importance features). Subjects who were less systematic, however, may not discriminate 
high-importance and low-importance features and may be influenced by heuristic cues like 
the number of dominating features. Thus, the likelihood of choosing an option that was 
dominant on high-importance features may not differ from that of choosing the one 
dominant on low-importance features.   
 This experiment was a 3 (promotion) x 2 (choice difficulty) x 2 (importance of 
dominant features) between subject design. Subjects were presented a “certain” promotion 
($50 gift certificate to Disneyland for any purchases over $200), or an “uncertain” 
promotion (30% chance to win a $150 gift certificate to Disneyland for any purchases over 
$200), or no promotion. The two choice options were non-dominant to each other in the 
difficult choice condition and one option was superior to the other in terms of the number 
of dominating features in the easy choice condition. Supporting the hypothesis, the data 
revealed that when the choice was easy, an uncertain promotion led to more systematic 
processing (indicated by a higher choice proportion of the option dominating on high (vs. 
low) importance features) than a certain promotion and no promotion. In contrast, when 
the choice was difficult, an uncertain promotion led to less systematic processing than a 
certain promotion and no promotion. Evaluation and recall data provided converging 
results.  
Overall, the results suggest that 1) store promotions may influence the decision-
making process of a subsequent product choice through promotion-induced affect, 2) 
uncertain promotions influence the decision-making process differently from certain 
promotions and no promotion situations, 3) the impact of uncertain promotions is 
moderated by choice difficulty. The demonstration of the impact of promotion-induced 
affect on product choices enables us to go beyond the traditional view of promotion as 
signals for product quality and understands the effect of various types of promotions on the 
choice decision-making process. The comparison of the certain, uncertain and no 
promotion in different choice contexts lends support to the uncertainty-focused research in 
the incidental affect research and highlights its importance when affect management 
objective is not salient (Wegener et al 1995).  
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The Impact of Certain and Uncertain Store Promotions on the Decision-Making 
Process in Product Choices 
Store promotions are widely used by retailers and are one of the most effective 
marketing drivers of sales (Blattberg and Neslin 1990). When consumers visit an online 
store, they are often prompted with a banner ad or a pop-up window, informing them of 
an available store promotion (e.g., “20% instant rebate, “Back to School Sweepstakes”). 
It is also common for a consumer to walk into a local grocery store and notice a display 
telling consumers that they have a chance to win a trip to Las Vegas or get free movie 
tickets for any purchases over fifty dollars.  
Store promotions presented at the beginning of a consumer’s shopping trip 
automatically influence the consumer’s affective states during the trip (e.g., Gardner 
1985). Although the promotion-induced affect should be regarded as irrelevant in 
subsequent product choices, previous research shows that it influences a consumer’s 
choice decision. For example, Heilman, Nakamoto and Rao (2002) find that in-store 
surprise coupons make a consumer feel positive and make more unplanned purchases. 
The impact of promotion-induced affect on a consumer’s product choice can find 
strong theoretical support from the incidental affect literature, which has demonstrated 
that affect elicited in one incident can extend its effect to other unrelated incidents (see 
Isen 2001, for review).  A majority of incidental affect research compares the impact of 
positive affect with that of negative affect and neutral state, and demonstrates that 
positive affect can enhance or impair subsequent systematic decision-making relative to 
neutral and negative affect (e.g., Wegener, Petty and Smith 1995). This group of studies 
is helpful for us to predict the impact of store promotions in general, relative to a no 
promotion situation. However, previous research demonstrates that relative pleasantness 
is quite unimportant in differentiating among positive emotions (e.g., Smith and 
Ellsworth 1985). That is, once a person feels good, the degrees of “goodness” are of little 
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use in predicting the impact of an emotion. Therefore, the focus on the positive valence 
of promotion-induced affect may be insufficient to discriminate the impact of a variety of 
promotions such as discounts, gift certificates, sweepstakes, or free shipping which 
generally would make consumers feel positive.  
Recent incidental affect literature demonstrates that, regardless of valence, the 
uncertainty associated with an affect influences the extent of systematic decision-making 
of a subsequent judgment (e.g.,Tiedens and Linton 2001). In fact, promotions are 
different in terms of the uncertainty of the benefit provided. For example, an instant 
dollar-off coupon provides more certain benefit than a sweepstakes or a contest. As a 
result, a promotion providing a probabilistic benefit (e.g., a sweepstakes) may make 
consumers feel more uncertain than a promotion providing a sure and immediate benefit 
(e.g., dollar-off discount). Thus, we believe that focusing on the uncertainty of 
promotion-induced affect can be important in differentiating the impact of types of 
promotions on the decision-making process for a product choice.  
The role of uncertainty associated with an incidental affect has not been studied in 
the context of store promotions and product choices. In addition, the uncertainty-focused 
incidental affect studies also have inconsistent findings and the specific effect of 
uncertainty remains inconclusive. Thus, this paper compares the affect induced by certain 
promotion, uncertain promotion and no promotion situation, and find out whether 
promotions varying in terms of associated uncertainty exert different impact on the 
subsequent product choice decision-making process through promotion-induced affect.  
Literature Review 
Incidental Affect and Its Impact on Subsequent Decision-making 
The construct of incidental affect is formally defined by Bodenhausen (1993). 
Different from integral affect, which involves emotional reactions generated by thoughts 
and associations related to the decision, incidental affect consists of emotional reactions 
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generated by thoughts and associations unrelated to the specific decision. For example, 
consumers may feel positive when they are presented with a coupon at the time they enter 
a store that promises a fifty-dollar gift certificate to Disneyland for the purchase of any 
digital camera. Since the positive affect is induced by the promotion, it is incidental with 
regard to the choice process of the digital camera.  
Previous research has demonstrated that incidental affect elicited in one context can 
influence information processing and judgment in other contexts (e.g., Isen 2001; Lerner 
and Keltner 2000; Tiedens and Linton 2001). The majority of studies of incidental affect 
have focused on valence, contrasting the effects of positive affect with neutral or negative 
affect. For example, Mackie and Worth (1989) find that people in a neutral affective state 
are more likely to be persuaded by strong (vs. weak) arguments, whereas people in happy 
affective state are equally likely to be persuaded by strong and weak arguments, 
reflecting an undermined message scrutiny. Wegener, et al. (1995) further demonstrates 
that positive affect can also enhance message scrutiny when the message is proattitudinal 
(i.e., the judgment task is hedonically positive), but impair message scrutiny when the 
message is counter-attitudinal (i.e., the judgment task is hedonically negative).  
Inconsistent with the valence-focused studies, recent research show that affect of 
the same valence can influence decision-making quite differently (Bodenhausen 1993; 
Keltner, Ellsworth and Edwards 1993). For example, Keltner, et al. (1993) demonstrates 
that although both sad and anger are negative affect, sad subjects perceive situation-
caused events as more likely while angry subjects perceive human-caused events as more 
likely. In fact, in addition to valence, emotions differ along five other cognitive appraisal 
dimensions: certainty, anticipated effort, attentional activity, self-other control, and 
situational control (Smith an Ellsworth 1985). Among them, the uncertainty has been 
specifically studied and shown to influence subsequent judgment and decision-making 
(e.g., Tiedens and Linton 2001).  
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Uncertainty refers to the degree to which future events seem unpredictable and 
incomprehensible. Affect may be similar in terms of pleasantness, but varies along 
uncertainty. For example, fear is associated with great uncertainty whereas anger is 
associated with great certainty (Smith and Ellsworth 1985). Using a “Perception of Risk 
Questionnaire”, Lerner and Keltner (2000) find that fearful subjects produce higher risk 
assessments than angry subjects, supporting the role of uncertainty. Further, Lerner, 
Gonzalez, Small and Fischhoff (2003) conduct a national field experiment after the tragic 
September 11th terrorist attack and find that respondents who feel scared perceive higher 
risk in non-terror related accidents than respondents who feel angry. 
The uncertainty of incidental affect is demonstrated to influence not only the risk 
assessment, but also the degree of systematic decision-making in a subsequent, unrelated 
decision task. For example, Tiedens and Linton (2001) use film clips or writing exercises 
to induce incidental affect that differs in valence and/or in uncertainty. For example, both 
happiness and surprise are positive affects, but happiness is associated with certainty 
whereas surprise is associated with uncertainty. They find that regardless of valence, a 
low-uncertainty affect (e.g., happiness, anger) generates more use of heuristic cues (e.g., 
message from expert source leads to more attitude change than that from non-expert 
source), higher reliance on stereotypes (e.g., athletes are more likely to lie) as well as less 
attention to argument quality (i.e., equally persuaded by strong and weak arguments) than 
does a high-uncertainty affect (e.g., hope, fear).  
While the importance of studying the uncertainty of incidental affect is supported 
by empirical evidence, there exist some inconsistent findings as to its specific impact. 
Although as reviewed earlier, an uncertain incidental affect can lead to more systematic 
decision-making (Tiedens and Linton 2001), it is found that uncertain affect can also lead 
to less systematic decision-making in subsequent decision tasks. For example, people 
who feel sad (associated with high uncertainty) are found to be more likely to show 
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anchoring bias (Bodenhausen, et al 2000). In addition, although valence-focused studies 
do not directly examine uncertainty, some research has induced incidental affect in a way 
that generates affect that is uncertain. For example, Mackie and Worth (1989) induce an 
uncertain positive affect by telling subjects the possibility of winning a lottery, and find 
subjects in such condition engage in less systematic processing (i.e., equally persuaded 
by strong and weak arguments) relative to those in a neutral condition. The inconsistent 
findings regarding to the impact of the uncertainty associated with incidental affect 
demands further investigation as the underlying mechanism of its impact. 
The Mechanism for the Impact of Uncertainty  
The impact of the uncertainty associated with incidental affect on the extent of 
systematic decision-making in subsequent tasks has been explained in previous research 
using the dual processing theory (Eagly and Chaiken 1993). According to this theory, 
people invest whatever amount of effort is required to attain a sufficiently confident 
assessment of message validity. When people’s actual level of confidence or certainty is 
below their desired level of confidence or certainty, they will apply more effort in the 
processing. Even though for an incidental affect, the feeling of uncertainty is elicited in 
an unrelated context, people may not distinguish the source of such a feeling (Wegener, 
et al. 1995). Thus, the feeling of uncertainty may be treated as an internal cue suggesting 
that one is not correct and that further processing is necessary (Schwarz 1990).  As a 
result, an uncertain (vs. certain) incidental affect is more likely to make people engage in 
an effortful decision-making process in a decision task completely unrelated to the affect-
eliciting situation.  
However, the feeling of uncertainty may also decrease a person’s perceived ability 
in systematically accomplishing the decision task. Previous research has demonstrated 
that when people have no control over an uncertainty event, not only the ability in 
resolving the uncertainty-eliciting event is decreased (Sprott, Brumbaugh and Miyazaki 
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2001), the perceived ability in a following, unrelated judgment task may also be 
decreased (Sedek, Kofta and Tyszka 1993). Low expectancy regarding one’s ability in a 
specific task will lead to a more heuristic decision-making mode, even when a 
consumer’s motivation to process systematically is high (Eagly and Chaiken 1993). 
Therefore, uncertainty may also lead to less systematic decision-making when the 
perceived ability is decreased as a result of uncertainty.  
The impact of a feeling of uncertainty on the perceived ability in a following task 
may be influenced by the degree of ambiguity in assessing the ability in the task. 
Generally, as proposed by the affect-as-information theory (Schwarz 1990), incidental 
affect may influence a following decision task in aspects that are ambiguous as suggested 
by the task. Similar findings are demonstrated for the valence of incidental affect. For 
example, Gorn, Pham and Sin (2001) show that when an ad has an ambiguous affective 
tone, the valence of a consumer’s incidental affective state influences the evaluation of 
the ad in an affect-congruent direction (i.e., positive affect leads to more favorable 
evaluation). However, when the ad has a clear positive or negative affective tone, the 
valence of the previous affective state does not influence the evaluation of the ad.  
Following the same logic, when a consumer’s ability to solve the choice task is 
ambiguous, we expect that he/she may be more susceptible to the influence of the 
uncertainty of an incidental affect and thus, an uncertain promotion may lead to 
decreased perceived ability in the choice task. However, when the ability in the choice 
task is not ambiguous, he/she is less likely to be influenced by the incidental affect in 
terms of the perceived ability.  
The ambiguity of ability assessment can be influenced by choice difficulty, which 
refers to the ease of identifying the superior option from among the choice alternatives. 
The decision is expected to be more difficult when the two alternatives are non-dominant 
in relation to each other than when one alternative is dominant over the other (Ha and 
 7 
Hoch 1989). When a choice is easy, subjects generally perceive themselves as being 
capable of systematically analyzing and integrating information to make a correct choice. 
Since the ability assessment is not ambiguous, the feeling of uncertainty induced by an 
uncertain promotion is less likely to add any informational value for the perceived ability 
judgment and thus should not decrease the perceived ability in an easy choice task. Since 
in this case, an uncertain promotion may decrease a subject’s confidence (Tiedens and 
Linton 2001) but not perceived ability, relative to a certain promotion or a no-promotion 
situation, the Ability and Motivation framework (Eagly and Chaiken 1993) would predict 
that for easy choices, the uncertain promotion leads to a more systematic decision-
making process than the certain promotion and the no-promotion situation. The above 
discussion is formally stated as H1 below:  
H1:  When a choice is easy, subjects are more likely to engage in a systematic 
decision process in an uncertain promotion condition than in a certain 
promotion and a no promotion condition. 
When the choice is difficult, however, it is often ambiguous to a subject whether 
he/she can systematically analyze and integrate all the information to make a correct 
choice (Payne, Bettman and Johnson 1988). Since the ability assessment is ambiguous, a 
subject is more likely to rely on his/her affective state (promotion-induced affect in this 
case) as an informational cue for the perceived ability judgment (Schwarz 1990). Thus, 
the feeling of uncertainty induced by an uncertain promotion is more likely to decrease a 
subject’s perceived ability in difficult choices, relative to a certain promotion and a no-
promotion situation. According to the Ability-Motivation Framework, therefore, the 
uncertain promotion should lead to a less systematic decision-making process relative to 
a certain promotion and a no-promotion situation, as summarized in H2 below:  
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H2:  When a choice is difficult, subjects are less likely to engage in a systematic 
decision process in an uncertain promotion condition than in a certain 
promotion and a no promotion condition. 
Experiment One 
In previous research, the extent of systematic decision-making is often indicated by 
the degree of information scrutiny (Tiedens and Linton 2001; Wegener, et al .1995). 
Subjects who engage in more systematic decision-making tend to scrutinize the 
information more carefully and thus, are more likely to detect the strength differences of 
various persuasive arguments and are more persuaded by strong (vs. weak) arguments. 
Subjects who engage in less systematic decision-making, however, are less likely to 
detect the strength differences of various arguments and may be equally persuaded by 
strong and weak arguments.  
This experiment investigated the extent of systematic decision-making in a similar 
way. Analogous to argument strength, the importance of various features describing 
choice options was measured and manipulated in such a way that a choice option was 
superior to an alternative choice option on high-importance features in half of the 
conditions, but on low-importance features in the other half. Relative to subjects in a less 
systematic decision-making process, subjects who engaged in a more systematic 
decision-making process should scrutinize the product features more carefully and thus 
be more likely to differentiate high-importance features from low-importance features. 
As a result, the choice decisions of subjects who were more systematic should be greatly 
influenced by the importance of dominating features and more subjects should choose the 
choice option that was dominant on high-importance features (vs. low-importance 
features). Subjects who were less systematic, however, may not discriminate high-
importance and low-importance features and may make decisions based on specific 
features or be influenced by heuristic cues like the number of dominating features. Thus, 
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the likelihood of choosing an option that was dominant on high-importance features and 
that was dominant on low-importance features may not differ.   
Based on the above operational measure of the systematic decision-making, H1 and 
H2 can be rephrased as in the following. For easy choices, more subjects in the uncertain 
promotion condition are expected to choose the choice option when it dominates on high-
importance features (vs. low-importance features), but the choice decisions of subjects in 
the “Certain Promotion” or the “No Promotion” condition are expected to be not 
differentially influenced by feature importance. For difficult choices, however, more 
subjects in the “Certain Promotion” and the “No Promotion” condition are expected to 
choose the choice option that dominates on high-importance features (vs. low-importance 
features), but the choice decisions of subjects in the “Uncertain Promotion” condition are 
expected to be not differentially influenced by feature importance.  
Pretests 
Two pretests were conducted to prepare for the stimuli used in Experiment One. 
Thirty-seven subjects participated in a pretest to construct the stimuli for the choice task. 
Subjects rated the importance of ten features of a digital camera on a 1 to 7 scale (1 for 
“Not important at all” and 7 for “Very Important”). The ratings revealed three high-
importance features: resolution (M =5.81), optical zoom (M =5.16) and memory 
(M=5.11) and three low-importance features: dimensions (M= 4.35), size of LCD (M = 
4.32), digital zoom (M = 4.29). Each of the high-importance features was rated as 
significantly more important than each of the low-importance features (all ps < .05).  
Fifty-six subjects participated in another pretest to evaluate two promotions. The 
first promotion was “You will get a $50 gift certificate for Disneyland if your purchases 
equal to or exceed $200”. The second promotion was “You will have a chance to win a 
$150 gift certificate for Disneyland if your purchases equal to or exceed $200. The 
chance of winning is one in every three people”. Subjects evaluated the uncertainty 
 10 
related to each promotion. The statements measuring uncertainty were adapted from 
Smith and Ellsworth (1985). The benefit of the second promotion was evaluated as 
significantly more uncertain than that of the first promotion (Mucp = 4.67, Mcp = 3.79, 
t(56) = 5.30, p < .0001).  
Design and Procedure 
This experiment was a 3 promotion conditions (certain, uncertain, no) x 2 choice 
difficulty (high vs. low) x 2 importance of dominating features (high vs. low) full 
factorial between-subject design. There were two cameras in the choice set and the order 
of presenting the two cameras was counter-balanced with Camera A presented on the left 
in half of the conditions and on the right in the other half. One camera was held constant 
in terms of feature descriptions in all conditions and was referred to as the control 
camera. 360 subjects were randomly assigned to one of the twelve conditions. 
Subjects were instructed to perform two independent tasks: a promotion evaluation 
task and a consumer choice task. In the first task, subjects were shown the interface of an 
online store followed by a pop-up window presenting an available promotion in the store. 
After reading about the promotion, subjects first wrote down all their thoughts about this 
promotion, then indicated the attractiveness of the promotion on a 1 to 7 scale anchored 
by “Not attractive at all” and “Very attractive” and the likelihood they would use such 
promotion on a 1 to 7 scale, anchored by “Not likely at all” and “Very likely”.   
After completing the promotion evaluation, half of subjects responded to the 
appraisal measures before proceeding to the second task. Specifically, subjects reported 
how pleasant they felt at that moment, how happy they were at that moment, how well 
they understood what was going on and how well they could predict what was going to 
happen in the future (adapted from Smith and Ellsworth, 1985). Meanwhile, the other half 
of the subjects proceeded to the second task. Later on, the two groups of subjects were 
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compared to determine whether the affective states measurement had generated any demand 
effect that biased the result in the second task. 
In the consumer choice study, subjects were told that they need to choose a digital 
camera from the previously-shown online store. Two digital cameras were shown, each 
described by six features. Subjects were required to read the features carefully and 
evaluate each camera on a 1 to 7 scale, with 1 indicating “Not attractive at all” and 7 
indicating “Very attractive”. Subjects then indicated which camera they would choose 
and rated the difficulty of making the choice on a 1 to 7 scale (with 1 indicating “Not 
Difficult at all” and 7 indicating “Very Difficult”). After two filler tasks, subjects were 
asked to recall all the features of the two cameras. 
Independent Variables 
The two promotions in the pretest were used to manipulate promotion uncertainty. 
Subjects in the “No promotion” condition were presented the same picture of the store as 
in the other two promotion conditions, but were not offered any promotion. In the 
“Difficult Choice” condition, subjects were presented with two cameras that were non-
dominant to each other. Each camera had three dominating features and three dominated 
features. In the “Easy Choice” condition, subjects were presented with two cameras in 
which the control camera (i.e., the same camera in all conditions) always dominated the 
alternative camera option. Compared with the alternative camera, the control camera had 
three dominating features, two dominated features and one same feature. 
The importance of the dominating features was manipulated by changing the 
proportion of important, dominating features of each camera. In the “High Importance” 
condition, the dominating features of the control camera consisted of two high-
importance features (e.g., resolution, optical zoom) and one low-importance feature (e.g., 
digital zoom). In the “Low Importance” condition, the dominating features of the control 
camera consisted of one high-importance feature (e.g., optical zoom) and two low-
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importance features (e.g., digital zoom, LCD display). Thus, the high or low importance 
condition referred to the dominance importance of the control camera. The three high-
importance features and three low-importance features were selected based on the pretest. 
High-importance features and low-importance features were presented in an alternating 
sequence, with each high-importance feature followed by a low-importance one.  
Dependent Measures 
Since the decision-making process influences the choice outcome, the choice 
proportion of cameras was examined to infer the extent of systematic decision-making in 
the choice process. The analysis focused on the choice proportion of the control camera 
since this camera was same in all conditions. In addition, since the two cameras in the 
difficult choice condition had equal number of dominating features and dominated 
features, the proportion choosing the camera dominating on high-importance features 
were combined and compared between conditions. Brand evaluations of each camera and 
recall were also examined as supplementary measures of the decision-making process.  
Results 
Manipulation Checks  
Promotion Uncertainty and Affective State. Between-subject T-tests showed that the 
“Certain Promotion” and the “Uncertain Promotion” were not significantly different in 
terms of attractiveness (Mcp = 3.99 vs. Mucp = 4.08, t(234) = .37, p > .1) and the likelihood 
of use (Mcp = 3.08 vs. Mucp = 3.27, t(234) = .84, p > .1). The responses to the first two 
questions measuring the affective state (pleasant and happy) were combined as a positive 
valence index (α = 0.90). The positive valence index was not significantly different 
between the two promotion conditions (Mcp = 3.74 vs. Mucp = 3.79, t(116) = .24, p >.50), 
but both were significantly more positive than the “No Promotion” condition (Mnp = 3.12; 
t(116) = 2.78, p  < .05 between certain and no promotion; t(116) = 2.82, p < .05 between 
uncertain and no promotion). The responses to the last two questions measuring the 
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affective state (understanding and prediction) were combined as a certainty index (α = 
0.82). Subjects felt significantly less certain in the “Uncertain Promotion” condition than 
in the “Certain Promotion” (Mucp = 4.23 vs. Mcp = 4.77, t(116) = 2.99, p < .01) and the 
“No Promotion” condition (Mucp = 4.23 vs. Mnp = 4.69, t(116) = 2.87, p < .01). The 
uncertainty of promotion-induced affect was not significantly different between the 
“Certain Promotion” and the “No Promotion” condition (p > .10).  
Choice Difficulty. The control camera was rated as more attractive than the other 
camera in the easy choice condition (Mcontrol = 5.54 vs. Malternative = 4.37; t(178) = 8.48, p 
< .0001) and the attractiveness ratings were not different in the difficult choice condition 
(Mcontrol = 5.19 vs. Malternative = 4.92, t(177) = 1.17, p > .1).  The choice was rated as more 
difficult in the difficult than the easy choice condition (Mdiff = 4.83 vs. Measy = 3.66, 
t(353) = 3.07, p < .01).   
Choice Proportion 
The order of presenting the two cameras did not produce any significant impact or 
correlate with any other variables (all p’s > .50). In addition, there was no significant 
difference between the group who responded to the affective state questions and the 
group who did not respond to those questions (all p’s > .50), suggesting that the affective 
state questions did not bias the choice and evaluation in the choice task. The data was 
thus collapsed in the analyses below.  
As predicted by H1, a 3 promotion (certain, uncertain vs. none) by 2 dominance 
importance (high vs. low) ANOVA conducted on the proportion choosing the control 
camera revealed a promotion by dominance importance interaction (F(2, 172) = 2.97, p = 
.05), indicating that the impact of dominance importance on the choice decision was 
moderated by types of promotions. Specifically, the proportion of subjects choosing the 
control camera was significantly higher in the high (vs. low) importance condition when 
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the promotion was uncertain (Mhi = 90%, Mlo = 63.33%, χ2(1) = 5.96, p = .01), but not 
different when the promotion was certain (Mhi = 76.67%, Mlo = 75.86%, χ2(1) = .0053, p 
= .94), or when there was no promotion (Mhi = 86.21%, Mlo = 70%, χ2(1) = 2.25, p = .13), 
indicating that the dominance importance influenced the choice decision more when the 
promotion was uncertain (vs. certain, or no).  
As predicted by H2, in the difficult choice condition, a 3 promotion (certain, 
uncertain vs. none) by 2 dominance importance (high vs. low) ANOVA conducted on the 
proportion choosing the control camera revealed a significant promotion by importance 
interaction (F(2, 171) = 4.23, p < .05). The proportion of subjects choosing the control 
camera was significantly higher in the high (vs. low) importance condition when the 
promotion was certain (Mhi = 68.97% vs. Mlo= 40%, χ2(1) = 4.98, p = .02) and when 
there was no promotion (Mhi = 66.67%, Mlo = 36.67%, χ2(1) = 5.41, p = .02), but was not 
significantly different between the two importance conditions when the promotion was 
uncertain (Mhi = 64.29% vs. Mlo = 46.67%, χ2(1) = 1.82, p = .18).  
Additional analyses were conducted on a measure that combined the camera 
dominating on high-importance features in the difficult choice condition. Pair-wise 
comparisons conducted on this combined measure revealed that subjects in the 
“Uncertain Promotion” condition were less likely to choose the camera dominating on 
high-importance features than subjects in the “Certain Promotion” condition (Mucp = 
58.62% vs. Mcp = 64.41%; t(114) = 2.07, p < .05) and subjects in the “No Promotion” 
condition (Mucp = 58.62% vs. Mnp = 65.00%; t(114) = 2.34, p < .05). The difference 
between “Certain Promotion” condition and the “No Promotion” condition was not 
significant (Mcp = 64.41% vs. Mnp = 65.00%; t(114) = .12, p = .94).  
  To graphically illustrate the impact of various promotions on the extent of 
systematic decision-making process of product choices, the difference in the proportion 
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of subjects choosing the control camera between the high and the low importance 
condition was computed for each of the 3 promotion by 2 choice difficulty conditions and 
represented in the figure below.  
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Brand Evaluation 
For easy choices, an attractiveness difference index was computed by deducting the 
attractiveness of the alternative camera from that of the control camera. Data revealed that 
when the choice was easy, the control camera was rated as more attractive than the other 
camera (all ps < .01). As predicted by H1, the 3 promotion by 2 importance ANOVA 
conducted on the attractiveness difference index revealed a significant interaction (F(2, 
172) = 4.16, p < .05). The attractiveness difference index was significantly higher in the 
high (vs. low) importance condition when the promotion was uncertain (Mhigh = 1.70 vs. 
Mlow = 0.70; t(58) = 2.42, p < .05), but not influenced by the dominance importance in the 
“Certain Promotion” (Mhigh = 1 vs. Mlow = 1.24; t(57) = .50, p > .20) and the “No 
Promotion” condition (Mhigh = 1.40 vs. Mlow = 0.90; t(57) = 1.08, p > .20).  
For difficult choices, another attractiveness difference index was computed by 
deducting the attractiveness of the camera dominating on low-importance features from 
that of the camera dominating on high-importance features. As predicted by H2, pair-
wise comparisons revealed that the attractiveness difference index was significantly 
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higher in the “Certain Promotion” than the “Uncertain Promotion” condition (Mcp = .65 
vs. Mucp = .10; t(118) = 3.70, p < .05), significantly higher in the “No Promotion” than 
the “Uncertain Promotion” condition (Mnp = .53 vs. Mucp = .10; t(118) = 2.58, p < .05), 
but not different between the “Certain Promotion” and the “No Promotion” condition 
(Mcp = .65 vs. Mnp = .53; t(118) = .67, p > .1).  
Recall 
Two independent coders counted the number of features recalled correctly for the 
two cameras by each subject (inter-rater reliability was 92%). A feature received a one if 
its value was recalled correctly and a zero if its value was not recalled correctly. H1 and 
H2 predict an interaction between promotion and choice difficulty on the number of 
features recalled correctly.  
As predicted by H1 and H2, the 3 promotion conditions by 2 choice difficulty 
ANOVA revealed an interaction (F(2, 300) = 3.62, p < .05). Pair-wise comparisons 
revealed that when the choice was easy, subjects recalled more features correctly in the 
“Uncertain Promotion” (vs. “Certain Promotion” condition) (Mucp = 5.04 vs. Mcp = 4.28, 
t(100) = 2.96, p < .05) and more in the “Uncertain Promotion” (vs. “No Promotion” 
condition)  (Mucp = 5.04 vs. Mnp = 3.88; t(99) = 3.58, p < .05). The correct recall was not 
significantly different between the “Certain Promotion” and the “No Promotion” 
condition (Mcp = 4.28 vs. Mnp = 3.88; t(95) = .98, p = .46). When the choice was difficult, 
subjects recalled fewer features correctly in the “Uncertain Promotion” (vs. “Certain 
Promotion” condition) (Mucp = 4.36 vs. Mcp = 5.07; t(100) = 2.72, p < .05), marginally 
fewer features correctly in the “Uncertain Promotion” (vs. “No Promotion” condition) 
(Mucp = 4.36 vs. Mnp = 4.78; t(104) = 1.72, p = .07). The recall was not significantly 
different between the “Certain Promotion” condition and the “No Promotion” condition 
(Mcp = 5.07 vs. Mnp = 4.78; t(102) = 1.13, p = .37).  
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General Discussion 
This paper investigates the impact of certain versus uncertain store promotions on 
the extent of systematic decision-making in subsequent product choices through 
promotion-induced affect. The experiment demonstrates that although both certain and 
uncertain promotions made consumers feel more positive than when no promotion was 
provided, an uncertain promotion increased the impact of feature importance on decision-
making when the choice was easy, but decreased the impact of feature importance when 
the choice was difficult, relative to a certain promotion and the no promotion situation.  
The results of this paper demonstrate the impact of uncertainty rather than the 
positive valence of an incidental affect on subsequent decision-making. This finding is 
consistent with an affect management perspective, which explains the impact of positive 
incidental affect as a result of people’s strategic effort to maintain such positive affect in 
the subsequent decision task (Wegener and Petty 1994).  When people engage in a task 
and feel worse because of it (e.g., engaging in counter-attitude behavior), they are more 
likely to reduce the decision-making effort and rely on heuristic cues in order to maintain 
their positive incidental affect. Since in this paper, subjects were asked to choose a 
camera they like best, which does not involve counter-attitudinal behavior, the strategic 
effort to maintain positive affect should become unnecessary and thus, the valence of an 
incidental affect has less impact.  
This paper contributes also to current studies about the effect of promotion on 
product evaluation. Previous research has demonstrated that promotion may decrease 
product evaluation because consumers tend to attribute their choices to the promotion 
rather than to the inherent attractiveness of the product (Tybout and Scott 1983) or 
promotions may provide information suggesting relative low quality of promoted 
products (Raghubir and Corfman 1999). The paper suggests that a store promotion can 
also influence consumer choice through promotion-induced affect. This provides us a 
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new framework to categorize various types of promotions and enriches our understanding 
about the influence of promotions on product choice.   
Although this paper examines store promotions, the effect of promotion-induced 
affect may not be restricted to store promotions, but might be extended to category-level 
promotions or any promotion that does not provide a salient information cue for product 
qualities. For example, a promotion used by an established product category in which 
promotion activity is regular may be more likely to influence the product choice process 
through promotion-induced affect rather than through a quality-inference process. Thus, 
this paper may also have implications on a manager’s promotion strategy.  
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